Abstract

Collective bargaining is an important part of industrial relations because it gives workers and employers a structured way to discuss employment conditions. In India, the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IRC) brings together the main central laws dealing with trade unions, standing orders and industrial disputes and creates a framework for a negotiating union or negotiating council. The main question of this article is whether legal recognition of a union necessarily leads to effective bargaining power for workers.

The article uses a doctrinal and analytical approach and studies the IRC, the Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026, judicial decisions, International Labour Organization materials and selected academic sources. It looks at how recognition works, the difference between a negotiating union and a negotiating council, and the importance of worker participation, union strength, membership verification and the changing nature of the workforce.

The article argues that recognition is an important starting point, but it is not by itself a measure of effective bargaining. A recognised union may have a formal place at the negotiating table but may still face problems such as divided membership, low participation, limited information, unequal resources and changes in employment patterns.

A negotiating council can protect representation of different groups, but it may also make it harder for unions to speak with one voice. The article therefore treats legal recognition and bargaining power as connected but different ideas and suggests practical steps such as transparent verification, stronger worker participation, better training, access to information and good-faith bargaining.

Keywords: collective bargaining; trade union; negotiating union; negotiating council; Industrial Relations Code, 2020; bargaining power; worker participation; industrial relations.

1. Introduction And Background

Collective bargaining is more than a procedure for discussing wages. It is a method of industrial governance through which workers, acting collectively, seek to influence the terms under which work is performed. Its subject matter may include wages, working time, leave, allowances, safety, welfare, discipline, promotion and other conditions of employment.

The process also has a relational dimension: it creates an institutional channel through which management and workers can communicate, identify competing interests and seek negotiated solutions. The International Labour Organization describes collective bargaining as a voluntary process through which employers and workers discuss and negotiate their relations, especially terms and conditions of work. The effectiveness of that process depends on genuine negotiation and good-faith conduct rather than merely on the existence of a formal bargaining structure. [7]

In India, trade unions have historically supplied the main organisational vehicle for collective bargaining. The constitutional freedom to form associations provides an important foundation for union activity, while labour legislation determines the legal incidents of registration, representation and industrial dispute settlement.

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 seeks to consolidate three major central labour laws:

• The Trade Unions Act, 1926;
• The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; and
• The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Code was brought into force on 21 November 2025, making the question of how its bargaining institutions operate especially important for contemporary Indian industrial relations. [1, 2]

The central research problem is clear: formal recognition of a trade union may provide legal status, but legal status does not automatically establish practical bargaining strength. This distinction is important because collective bargaining is affected by factors outside the recognition certificate itself.

A union’s ability to mobilise members, collect reliable information, formulate realistic demands, maintain internal democracy, communicate with workers and negotiate consistently can influence the results of bargaining. Employer strategy, market conditions and the structure of employment can also affect the bargaining environment.

The IRC addresses representation through the concept of a negotiating union or negotiating council. Where multiple registered unions exist, the legal framework provides a method for identifying a sole negotiating union where the prescribed majority support exists and otherwise provides for representation through a negotiating council.

The detailed verification procedure is supplemented by rules. The framework therefore attempts to solve a recurring industrial-relations problem: when several unions claim to speak for workers, the employer needs a defined bargaining counterpart, while workers need a mechanism that does not simply erase minority representation. [1, 3]

This article examines that tension. It does not treat recognition as synonymous with bargaining power. Instead, it asks how far the legal framework can create conditions for meaningful bargaining and where practical limitations remain.

The analysis is especially relevant because the modern workforce is increasingly diverse, with differences in occupation, skill, employment status, workplace location and expectations. A recognition model that works formally may still produce weak representation if workers are not adequately involved in the bargaining process.

2. Statement Of The Research Problem, Gap And Objectives

The main research problem is whether legal recognition of a trade union under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 necessarily strengthens the bargaining power of workers. The issue is not whether recognition has value. Recognition clearly matters because it identifies the body authorised to negotiate with the employer within the legal framework.

The more difficult question is whether the recognised status produces substantive influence over employment conditions. The distinction may be expressed simply: recognition is a legal and institutional status, whereas bargaining power is the practical capacity to secure, defend or modify outcomes through negotiation.

Multiple Unions And Representation

Several issues arise when more than one union operates in the same establishment.

1. First, there may be disagreement about which organisation has sufficient support to speak for workers.
2. Second, a majority union may have formal authority while minority unions continue to represent significant groups of workers.
3. Third, a council model may preserve plural representation but create coordination problems.
4. Fourth, the numerical test used for recognition depends on accurate and trusted verification of worker support.
5. Finally, bargaining power can be affected by factors that numerical membership alone cannot capture, such as worker participation, financial resources, leadership quality, access to information and the credibility of collective action.

Research Gap

The research gap identified in the draft is the need for a focused examination of the relationship between legal recognition and practical bargaining effectiveness. Literature on trade unions, collective bargaining and labour-law reform is extensive, but the specific relationship between the Code’s recognition mechanism and bargaining power deserves separate analysis, especially after the Code’s implementation and the notification of the Central Rules in 2026.

The article treats the statutory mechanism as a starting point and examines the institutional conditions necessary for it to work effectively. [3]

Objectives Of The Study

Objectives of the study are:

1. To examine the concept and importance of collective bargaining in Indian industrial relations;
2. To analyse the provisions of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 relating to trade-union recognition and collective bargaining;
3. To examine the role of the negotiating union and negotiating council;
4. To assess whether recognition strengthens workers’ bargaining power;
5. To identify legal and practical challenges affecting effective collective bargaining; and
6. To suggest measures for strengthening worker representation and collective bargaining.

Research Questions

• How does the Code regulate recognition for collective bargaining?
• Do the negotiating union and negotiating council provide effective representation?
• Does formal recognition necessarily strengthen bargaining power?
• What practical factors influence the outcome of bargaining?
• What institutional measures can improve representation while preserving a workable bargaining relationship?

3. Conceptual Framework: Recognition, Representation And Bargaining Power

Trade-union recognition and collective bargaining are connected but conceptually distinct. Registration establishes a union’s legal existence under the relevant legal framework; recognition for bargaining determines which union or representative body is entitled to negotiate with the employer.

Bargaining power, by contrast, concerns the ability of workers and their organisation to influence the terms of negotiation. A union may be legally recognised but have limited influence if it lacks member participation, credible negotiating strategies, information or organisational cohesion.

Three Dimensions Of Representation

A recognition mechanism primarily addresses the first dimension, while effective collective bargaining requires all three.

The concept of bargaining power should also be understood in relation to each other. Neither side possesses bargaining power in isolation. An employer may possess financial resources, organisational control and access to management information. Workers collectively possess labour, knowledge of workplace conditions and the possibility of coordinated action.

The relative strength of these resources can change over time. Economic conditions, labour shortages, technological changes, outsourcing and employment insecurity may alter the bargaining position of each side. Consequently, a legal recognition threshold cannot itself measure the full practical capacity of a union.

Collective bargaining also differs from individual negotiation because its legitimacy is derived from collective representation. A negotiated settlement can create common rules for a group of workers, reduce the need for repeated individual disputes and provide greater predictability for management.

The ILO framework emphasises voluntary bargaining and good-faith negotiation. This suggests that an effective legal system should not merely identify the bargaining agent; it should also create conditions in which negotiations can be genuine, informed and constructive. [8, 10]

The distinction becomes especially important under a majority-based recognition model. A union with the required support can be treated as the sole negotiating union even though a proportion of workers may have supported other organisations.

The legal system so has to balance two values:

• Bargaining efficiency through a defined counterpart; and
• Representational pluralism through respect for minority groups.

The negotiating council is one institutional response to that problem. [1]

4. Legal Evolution And The Industrial Relations Code, 2020

Indian industrial relations developed through a combination of trade-union legislation, dispute-settlement legislation and sectoral or state-level recognition mechanisms.

The Trade Unions Act, 1926 provided a registration framework for trade unions. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 established mechanisms for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, but the central framework did not create a universal recognition system comparable to some state legislation.

Recognition questions as a result developed through a mixture of legislation, collective practice and judicial decisions. [1, 5]

Maharashtra Recognition Framework

The Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 is especially significant to the study of recognition because it established a statutory system in which a recognised union could exercise important representative functions.

In Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court considered the constitutional position of a recognised union and discussed the rationale for selecting a representative union where multiple unions exist.

The judgment illustrates an important principle for this research: recognition can be designed to create a clear bargaining agent without abolishing the ability of workers to form other associations. [5]

Industrial Relations Code, 2020

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 consolidates the central legal framework relating to trade unions, conditions of employment in industrial establishments and industrial dispute investigation and settlement.

Its approach to bargaining representation is more explicit than the general central framework that preceded it. Section 14 establishes that there shall be a negotiating union or negotiating council, as the case may be, for negotiation with the employer on prescribed matters.

This places the representative bargaining relationship directly within the statutory architecture. [1]

The Code became operational on 21 November 2025. The Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026 were notified on 8 May 2026.

The Central Rules provide procedural details concerning recognition, verification and matters for negotiation. Because the Code permits both the Central and State Governments to make rules within their respective spheres, the precise procedural framework may vary according to the appropriate government.

This distinction is important when applying the rules to a particular establishment. [2, 3]

The transition from the older laws to the Code so represents both consolidation and institutional change. The legal system now places negotiating unions and councils within a single code rather than leaving recognition primarily to sectoral or state mechanisms.

Whether that consolidation improves bargaining effectiveness cannot be answered by statutory text alone. It requires consideration of how representation is verified, how unions operate after recognition and how workers participate in bargaining.

5. Section 14: Negotiating Union And Negotiating Council

Section 14 is the centre of the research problem. It establishes a negotiating union or negotiating council for bargaining with the employer.

The statutory design recognises that an establishment may have one registered union or several. Where one union operates, the framework provides for recognition subject to the prescribed conditions.

Where several unions operate, a majority-support test is used to determine whether one union becomes the sole negotiating union; where no union crosses the majority threshold, a negotiating council is formd from qualifying unions. [1]

Verification Of Support

The current Central Rules provide a procedural framework for verifying support. The Ministry’s 2026 rules specify matters that may be negotiated, procedures concerning representation and verification, and the role of the negotiating union or council in workplace institutions.

The Ministry’s compliance handbook states that where more than one registered union operates, a union supported by 51 per cent or more of workers is recognised as the negotiating union; where no union reaches 51 per cent, registered unions meeting the 20 per cent support threshold participate in the negotiating council.

These thresholds are central to the research question because they translate worker preference into institutional bargaining status. [3, 4]

Majority Recognition

The majority threshold serves a clear function: it can reduce uncertainty about who speaks for the workforce. If two or more unions continuously negotiate with an employer on overlapping issues, management may receive competing demands and workers may receive fragmented representation.

A single negotiating union can simplify the bargaining process, make responsibility clearer and help the conclusion of a collective settlement. It can also reduce the possibility that a small organisation claims authority over the whole workforce without sufficient support.

At the same time, majority recognition creates a representational issue. Suppose an establishment has three unions and the largest has 52 per cent support while the remaining workers are divided between two unions.

The largest union obtains sole negotiating status, but nearly half of the workforce may have supported other organisations. Formal authority and broad representativeness are so not identical.

The recognised union has a responsibility to bargain in a manner that takes account of the wider workforce rather than treating the majority threshold as a licence to disregard minority concerns.

Role Of The Negotiating Council

The negotiating council addresses a different problem. Where no union reaches the required majority, a council permits qualifying unions to participate according to their support.

This preserves a degree of plural representation and may increase legitimacy among workers who do not belong to the largest union. The trade-off is practical: multiple representatives must coordinate demands, negotiate internally and present a coherent position to management.

A council can so strengthen representational inclusiveness while potentially increasing bargaining complexity. [1, 3]

The legal structure as a result reflects an attempt to balance efficiency and pluralism. Neither model is automatically effective.

• A sole union requires internal democracy and accountability.
• A council requires coordination and common procedures.

The central issue is whether the institutional arrangement produces a bargaining process in which workers can influence outcomes rather than merely occupy a legally recognised position.

7. The Negotiating Union: Advantages And Representational Limits

A sole negotiating union can provide an identifiable bargaining counterpart. For employers, this may reduce administrative uncertainty because negotiations can be conducted through one recognised institution.

For workers, a single bargaining agent can consolidate demands and avoid situations in which unions compete by making inconsistent proposals. A single agent can also make collective settlements easier to administer because there is a clearer line between negotiation, ratification and implementation.

Internal Accountability

The strength of this model, however, depends on internal accountability. A union that obtains the required majority is not necessarily equally trusted by every worker.

The difference between numerical majority and real legitimacy becomes important after recognition. If the union’s leadership makes decisions without consulting members, workers may become disengaged even though the union remains legally recognised.

Conversely, regular membership meetings, transparent communication, representative bargaining committees and clear procedures for approving settlements can convert formal recognition into practical legitimacy.

Relationship With Minority Unions

Another issue is the relationship between the recognised union and minority unions. Recognition does not necessarily mean that minority unions cease to exist.

The Supreme Court’s discussion in Balmer Lawrie shows that formation of an association and recognition for particular statutory purposes are distinct concepts.

This distinction remains relevant under a modern bargaining framework. A minority organisation may continue to represent members in matters permitted by law even though it does not possess the same negotiating status as the recognised union. [5]

Risk Of Over-Centralisation

The risk of over-centralisation should so be considered. If all collective bargaining authority is concentrated in one organisation without adequate internal safeguards, workers who disagree with the union’s leadership may have limited influence over collective priorities.

This is especially significant where the workforce contains different occupational groups, shifts, locations or employment arrangements. A union that formally represents the entire workforce must create channels through which those groups can communicate their interests.

The negotiating union can also become a source of stability. Collective bargaining works better when both sides know who has authority to negotiate and when agreements can be implemented consistently.

A stable representative can develop institutional knowledge about the workplace, understand previous settlements and maintain continuing dialogue with management. This continuity may improve the quality of negotiation beyond what is possible through ad hoc representation.

The critical conclusion is conditional. A sole negotiating union may strengthen bargaining by concentrating representation, but the effect depends on how the union uses that institutional position.

Recognition supplies authority; it does not supply organisational competence. The union’s bargaining capacity is built through membership participation, leadership, financial sustainability, access to information, negotiation skills and credibility with workers and management.

8. The Negotiating Council: Plural Representation And Coordination

The negotiating council is designed for a divided union environment. Its basic rationale is democratic representation: when no single union commands the required majority, more than one organisation may participate in bargaining.

The rules provide representation for unions that cross the prescribed support threshold, with representation linked to their membership. This arrangement recognises that a divided workforce cannot always be accurately represented by a single union selected merely because it is the largest.

Advantages Of The Negotiating Council

The principal advantage of the council is inclusion. Workers supporting different unions have an institutional route through which their organisations can participate in collective negotiations.

This can improve the perceived legitimacy of bargaining outcomes, especially where no union has majority support. It can also encourage unions to cooperate on common demands rather than compete solely for recognition.

Coordination Costs

However, plural representation introduces coordination costs. Each union may have different priorities, political affiliations, workplace strategies or expectations.

Representatives must agree on which demands should be advanced, which proposals can be compromised and how negotiations with management should be conducted.

If representatives send inconsistent signals, the employer may find it difficult to identify a common position. If internal disagreements dominate the bargaining process, the council may become procedurally representative but substantively weak.

Internal Procedures For A Negotiating Council

The council model so requires clear internal procedures. Representatives should:

• Receive adequate information before meetings;
• Agree on the issues to be negotiated;
• Record decisions; and
• Communicate the outcome to their respective members.

The council should also have a transparent method for resolving disagreements. Majority decision-making among representatives may be necessary for operational purposes, but minority views should be recorded where they concern significant matters.

Such procedures can help maintain both efficiency and representational fairness.

The council may also function as an reason for inter-union cooperation. If unions understand that none can obtain a sole bargaining position without majority support, they may develop common platforms or coordination mechanisms.

Cooperation does not eliminate competition, but it can redirect competition toward membership service and organisational performance. Over time, this may strengthen the overall quality of worker representation.

Nevertheless, the council should not be assumed to be automatically more democratic simply because it contains several unions. Representation is meaningful only if representatives are accountable to their members and have the capacity to negotiate.

A council in which unions are present but unable to agree may not produce effective bargaining. The relevant measure is so not the number of representatives at the table but whether the structure enables workers’ interests to be articulated, prioritised and negotiated in a coherent manner.

9. Bargaining Power Beyond Legal Recognition

The central proposition of this article is that recognition and bargaining power should not be treated as interchangeable.

Recognition answers the question ‘who is authorised to negotiate?’ Bargaining power addresses a different question: ‘how effectively can that representative influence the negotiation?’ The first is primarily legal and institutional; the second is organisational, economic and relational.

Worker Participation

Worker participation is one of the most important variables. A union with high formal membership but low active participation may struggle to maintain bargaining strength.

Participation can include:

• Attending meetings;
• Discussing workplace problems;
• Contributing to bargaining priorities;
• Voting on important decisions; and
• Understanding collective agreements.

Participation also provides information to union leadership about the actual conditions experienced by workers. Without this information, bargaining demands may become disconnected from workplace realities.

Union Strength

Union strength is also made up of several parts. Membership numbers matter because collective bargaining is based on collective representation.

But organisational strength includes financial resources, trained representatives, access to legal and technical expertise, internal communication systems and the ability to maintain member confidence.

A union that can analyse wage structures, productivity information, safety data and employment trends may negotiate more effectively than an organisation that relies only on broad demands.

Access To Information

Access to information is especially important. Bargaining is rarely equal if one side possesses significantly better information about the employer’s finances, productivity, staffing, future investment or proposed restructuring.

Good-faith bargaining requires meaningful engagement, and meaningful engagement is difficult when proposals cannot be evaluated with adequate information.

Mechanisms for sharing relevant information, subject to legitimate confidentiality requirements, can so strengthen the quality of bargaining.

Credibility And Employment Structure

Credibility is another component of bargaining power. Workers must believe that their representatives will follow through on negotiated commitments.

Employers must believe that union representatives can communicate and secure worker acceptance of settlements. Credibility is built gradually through consistent conduct.

A union that makes demands it cannot sustain may lose negotiating influence; an employer that repeatedly disregards agreements may weaken trust and make future bargaining more difficult.

The employment structure also matters. The growth of contractual, fixed-term, outsourced and other non-standard forms of work can create different interests within the same establishment.

If a recognised union primarily represents permanent workers while other categories have limited voice, the formal bargaining structure may not reflect the full workforce experience. The legal framework therefore needs to be accompanied by inclusive representation practices.

10. Practical Challenges Under The Code

1. Verification Of Membership And Support

First, verification of membership and support is critical. Recognition depends on reliable evidence of worker support. If workers, unions or employers do not trust the verification process, the result may be challenged and the bargaining relationship may begin with procedural conflict.

Secret-ballot and verification procedures can improve legitimacy, but they require accurate voter lists, transparent administration and protection against coercion. [3, 4]

2. Union Division

Second, union division among unions remains a structural challenge. Multiple unions may emerge because of occupational differences, ideological differences, regional identities, leadership disputes or competing approaches to management.

The negotiating council provides a mechanism for representation, but it does not eliminate the underlying causes of division among unions. Where unions are unable to cooperate, bargaining can become slow and internally contested.

3. Wider Economic Environment

Third, there may be a gap between formal bargaining subjects and the wider economic environment. The Central Rules identify a broad range of matters for negotiation, including wages, working time, leave, promotion, discipline, safety and other conditions of employment.

Yet the ability to negotiate these matters may depend on production cycles, financial conditions, technological change and competitive pressures. A union may so have a formal right to negotiate without having sufficient leverage to obtain its preferred outcome. [3]

4. Unequal Access To Information

Fourth, unequal access to information can reduce the quality of bargaining. Workers may not have access to information needed to assess management proposals.

Employers may also face difficulties when unions present demands without sufficient evidence about worker priorities or operational constraints. Institutional mechanisms for structured information exchange can reduce this problem.

5. Changing Categories Of Workers

Fifth, representation of changing categories of workers raises questions about the scope of collective bargaining. Contemporary establishments may contain permanent employees, fixed-term employees, contract labour, trainees, apprentices and workers engaged through different arrangements.

Their legal positions and interests may not be identical. If the bargaining structure does not adequately reflect these differences, the recognised body may face a legitimacy problem.

6. Implementation And Follow-Up

Sixth, the effectiveness of collective bargaining depends on implementation. A negotiated settlement has little practical value if it is not communicated, administered and monitored.

Disputes can arise about interpretation, eligibility and implementation even after successful negotiations. A strong bargaining system so needs mechanisms for follow-up and grievance handling.

11. Judicial Perspective And Case Studies

Case Study 1: Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. (1984)

Judicial decisions concerning recognised unions provide useful context for understanding the relationship between recognition and representation. In Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court considered the Maharashtra recognition framework and upheld the distinction between the existence of a union and its status as the recognised bargaining representative.

The Court discussed the need for a recognised union where multiple unions seek to represent workers and linked the recognition model to the objective of facilitating collective bargaining and industrial peace.

The case is useful for the present study for two reasons.

1. First, it shows that recognition is not equivalent to the fundamental freedom to form an association. Workers may continue to form or belong to unions even when another union has the recognised status for specified representative purposes.
2. Second, it shows why a legal system may choose one bargaining agent when multiple unions exist: collective bargaining requires a practical counterpart capable of entering into negotiations and settlements.

At the same time, the decision should not be treated as proof that recognition automatically produces bargaining power. The judgment arose under a specific state statute with its own recognition structure and should not be mechanically transplanted into every aspect of the IRC.

Its value is conceptual. It helps distinguish the legal status of recognition from the broader question of how workers are represented and how collective bargaining operates.

Case Study 2: Food Corporation Of India Staff Union v. Food Corporation Of India (1995)

In Food Corporation of India Staff Union v. Food Corporation of India, the Supreme Court considered how the representative character of competing trade unions could be determined where more than one union sought to act for employees.

The Court dealt with an agreed secret-ballot process for assessing the relative strength of eligible unions and prescribed a procedure under the supervision of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). [6]

The decision is relevant to the present article because it connects union recognition with the practical question of identifying a representative bargaining agent. It also illustrates the importance of a transparent and reliable method of verifying worker support.

Unlike Balmer Lawrie, which focuses on the legal position of a recognised union and minority associations, this case provides a judicial example of membership verification as a basis for determining representative status.

Together, the two cases help explain why recognition requires both a clear legal framework and a credible method of establishing worker support.

Majority Rule And Associational Freedom

The judicial perspective also highlights the importance of balancing majority rule and associational freedom. A majority-based bargaining agent can provide clarity, but minority unions may continue to have legitimate interests.

The statutory challenge is so to give the recognised union sufficient authority to negotiate while preserving lawful space for other worker organisations and individual rights. [5]

This balance is consistent with the broader ILO approach to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The ILO identifies freedom of association and effective recognition of collective bargaining as fundamental labour principles and emphasises that bargaining should be voluntary and conducted in good faith.

These principles provide a useful interpretive framework, although the precise legal obligations in India depend on domestic law and the conventions India has ratified. [8]

The case law and international standards so reinforce the article’s central distinction. Recognition is necessary for an organised bargaining system, but the effectiveness of bargaining must be assessed through the quality of representation, participation, negotiation and implementation.

The legal framework creates the structure; the industrial-relations actors determine how effectively the structure is used. [5, 8]

12. Critical Analysis: Does Recognition Strengthen Bargaining Power?

The answer emerging from the analysis is conditional. Recognition can strengthen bargaining power because it provides institutional acceptance, identifies the authorised bargaining counterpart and reduces uncertainty about who may negotiate on behalf of workers.

It can also help employers by creating a stable channel for negotiation. These are significant benefits and explain why legal recognition is an important part of industrial relations.

However, recognition is not sufficient by itself.

Limitations Of Recognition

The negotiating council presents a different balance. It may increase representational legitimacy because several unions participate, but it can reduce bargaining coherence if the representatives disagree.

The council’s success so depends heavily on coordination. The existence of a council should not be judged simply by whether every qualifying union receives a seat; the relevant issue is whether the council can convert plural representation into a common bargaining strategy.

Institutional Safeguards

The practical implication is that recognition should be accompanied by institutional safeguards. These include:

• Transparent verification;
• Periodic accountability to members;
• Access to relevant information;
• Consultation before major settlements;
• Training for union representatives; and
• Mechanisms for resolving internal disagreements.

Employers also benefit from these safeguards because predictable and representative bargaining can reduce repeated disputes.

The research hypothesis that formal recognition does not necessarily result in effective bargaining power is so supported as an analytical proposition.

Recognition creates an opportunity for bargaining but does not guarantee a particular result. The second hypothesis is also supported in the sense that worker participation and union strength are essential conditions for turning formal recognition into effective representation. [1, 3]

This conclusion should not be misunderstood as reducing the importance of law. Legal design matters greatly because it determines the institutional rules within which bargaining takes place.

A poorly designed recognition system can generate uncertainty, exclusion or rivalry. A clear system can help stable bargaining. But even a clear legal system cannot substitute for organisational capacity and genuine participation.

A Sequential Understanding

The most appropriate understanding is so sequential:

Bargaining power emerges from the interaction of all these factors rather than from recognition alone.

13. Recommendations

1. Strengthen Transparency In Verification

The process for determining union support should be clear, timely and trusted by all parties. Voter eligibility, verification procedures and the handling of objections should be communicated in advance. Secret-ballot mechanisms should be administered independently and without coercion.

2. Encourage Internal Union Democracy

Recognition should be accompanied by meaningful consultation with members. Unions should maintain regular membership meetings, communicate bargaining proposals and provide members with understandable information about settlements. Internal accountability can strengthen the legitimacy of a recognised union.

3. Develop Bargaining Capacity

Training should be provided to union representatives in labour law, negotiation, financial analysis, workplace safety, technology and communication. Capacity building is especially important where unions face complex restructuring or changing employment arrangements.

4. Improve Access To Relevant Information

Collective bargaining should be informed by reliable data. Subject to legitimate confidentiality requirements, employers should provide information reasonably necessary for negotiating matters, while unions should present evidence-based demands. Structured information exchange can reduce misunderstanding and improve negotiation quality.

5. Establish Clear Council Procedures

Where a negotiating council is formd, the representatives should adopt written procedures for agenda setting, internal consultation, decision-making, recording dissent and communicating outcomes. The aim should be to preserve plural representation without allowing procedural disagreement to prevent bargaining.

6. Protect Meaningful Minority Participation

A sole negotiating union should recognise that majority status does not mean that every worker shares the same interests. Internal committees or consultation mechanisms can allow occupational groups and minority viewpoints to contribute to bargaining priorities without undermining the statutory role of the recognised union.

7. Include Changing Categories Of Workers Where Legally Appropriate

The bargaining structure should pay attention to the realities of contract, fixed-term and other non-standard employment. Where legal coverage differs, unions and employers should however consider how workplace-wide issues affect different categories of workers.

8. Strengthen Implementation And Follow-Up

Collective agreements should clearly identify responsibilities, timelines and mechanisms for resolving implementation disputes. Periodic joint review meetings can help prevent minor disagreements from developing into larger disputes.

9. Promote Good-Faith Bargaining

The parties should approach negotiation with genuine intent to engage, exchange proposals, consider alternatives and implement agreed settlements. This principle is consistent with the ILO’s description of effective collective bargaining. [10]

10. Continue Field-Based Research

The present study is doctrinal and analytical. Future research should examine actual establishments after the Code’s implementation, including membership patterns, bargaining outcomes, worker satisfaction, council functioning and the duration of negotiations.

Empirical evidence would help determine how the legal framework operates in practice across sectors and States.

14. Intended Conclusion

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 marks an important development in the statutory architecture of Indian collective bargaining by providing an explicit mechanism for a negotiating union or negotiating council.

The framework addresses a practical problem that has long accompanied union pluralism: an employer and a workforce need a defined institutional channel through which collective negotiations can take place.

Majority recognition can provide clarity and continuity, while the negotiating council can preserve representation where no single union commands the required support.

Yet the central finding of this article is that legal recognition and bargaining power are not the same thing. Recognition gives a union or council a formal position in the bargaining process, but it does not by itself guarantee that workers will have strong influence over the outcome.

Bargaining power depends on worker participation, organisational strength, credible leadership, access to information, negotiation capacity, internal accountability and the broader economic and employment environment.

The distinction is especially important because a majority union may formally represent the workforce while substantial minority groups continue to have different priorities.

The council model addresses this problem through plural representation, but it can create coordination difficulties. The effectiveness of either model so depends on the quality of the institutions operating within the legal framework.

The research supports the proposition that recognition should be viewed as a foundation rather than a final measure of collective bargaining effectiveness.

A successful system requires more than a numerical test. It requires transparent verification, meaningful participation, representative internal structures, informed negotiation and good-faith implementation.

These factors can help transform legal recognition into practical representation.

The Code’s implementation also creates an opportunity for future evaluation. Since the Code came into force in November 2025 and the Central Rules were notified in May 2026, long-term empirical evidence will be necessary to assess whether the new framework changes bargaining outcomes, union behaviour and worker participation.

Differences between central and state spheres also make comparative study important. [2, 3]

Ultimately, the effectiveness of collective bargaining cannot be measured solely by whether a union has been recognised.

The more meaningful question is whether workers, through their representative institutions, can participate in negotiations and influence the terms and conditions governing their working lives.

Recognition is the legal gateway; bargaining power is the practical capacity that must be built and exercised through collective organisation. The relationship between the two is so complementary, but not automatic.

References

Primary Legal Sources

1. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (Act No. 35 of 2020), India Code, Ministry of Law and Justice / Legislative Department.
2. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, S.O. 5320(E), Notification dated 21 November 2025, bringing the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 into force.
3. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, G.S.R. 342(E), Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026, dated 8 May 2026.
4. Ministry of Labour and Employment, Compliance Handbook for Labour Codes, 2026.

Judicial Decisions

5. Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd., 1984 Supp SCC 663 (Supreme Court of India).
6. Food Corporation of India Staff Union v. Food Corporation of India, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 678 (Supreme Court of India).

International And Secondary Sources

7. International Labour Organization, What is collective bargaining? (2014).
8. International Labour Organization, Labour Standards on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (2017).
9. International Labour Organization, Challenges, Prospects and Opportunities of Ratifying ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 in India (2011).
10. International Labour Organization, Business and Collective Bargaining, ILO Helpdesk (2024).
11. International Labour Organization, Social Dialogue in the Public Services in South Asia: A Comparative Overview of the Laws, Institutions and Practices in India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, ILO Working Paper 73 (2022).
12. Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero & Horacio Guido, ‘ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’, International Labour Review, Vol. 139(1), pp. 33–55 (2000).
13. PRS Legislative Research, Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026.