Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka: When Section 498-A Reaches a Live-In Relationship
A man cannot necessarily walk out of a Section 498-A case simply by saying, “We were never married.”
That is the practical significance of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026 by Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.
But the judgment needs to be read carefully.
The Supreme Court has not held that every live-in relationship is a marriage for the purposes of criminal law. Nor has it given the police an unrestricted power to arrest people involved in such relationships.
What the Court has done is considerably narrower, but potentially very important in day-to-day criminal and family-law practice.
Where a live-in relationship has the characteristics of a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, and where intent to marry formed an intrinsic part of that relationship, Section 498-A IPC can apply. For offences committed after 1 July 2024, the same reasoning becomes relevant to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
At the same time, the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar remain firmly in place.
For lawyers handling 498-A complaints, quashing petitions, domestic disputes and matrimonial litigation, that combination is what makes Lokesh B.H. significant.
Why This Judgment Matters in Practice
Section 498-A has long been one of the most frequently invoked provisions in matrimonial and domestic-cruelty litigation.
In many cases, particularly where the alleged marriage is disputed, the defence begins with a seemingly straightforward argument:
- There was no valid marriage.
- Therefore, there was no husband.
- Therefore, Section 498-A cannot apply.
After Lokesh B.H., that argument cannot be treated as sufficient by itself.
The court may now have to look beyond the formal status of the relationship and examine how the parties actually lived.
- Was there a relationship in the nature of marriage?
- Was there an intention to marry?
- Did the relationship operate as a domestic partnership resembling marriage?
- And, even after those questions are answered, do the allegations actually disclose the statutory ingredients of cruelty?
These questions are likely to become central both to the prosecution and to the defence.
It is also important to recognise how new this development is. The judgment was delivered only recently, and subsequent courts have not yet had the opportunity to define all of its outer boundaries. Some of the most difficult questions will therefore have to be answered in future litigation.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
The factual background is important because the judgment cannot be understood in isolation from the allegations before the Court.
Dr. Lokesh B.H., a cardiologist, was married to Naveena in February 2000.
Another woman, Smt. Theertha, alleged that she subsequently married Lokesh according to Hindu rites on 17 October 2010. According to her case, they lived together in Bengaluru and later in Shivamogga.
She alleged that her family had given gold, silver and cash and that further dowry demands were subsequently made. She also alleged physical and mental harassment and an attempt to burn her.
Two complaints lodged in 2016 resulted in charge-sheets under Section 498-A IPC and several other provisions, including Sections 307, 494, 504 and 506 IPC and provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Lokesh’s defence was straightforward.
His first marriage was still subsisting. Therefore, there could not have been a legally valid second marriage. He argued that he was consequently not the woman’s “husband” within the meaning of Section 498-A.
He also instituted civil proceedings seeking a declaration that no marital relationship existed.
The Karnataka High Court, however, refused to quash the criminal proceedings in November 2025.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj adopted a purposive approach to the expression “husband”. The High Court’s reasoning was essentially that a man who holds himself out as a husband, lives with a woman in a relationship bearing the characteristics of marriage, and allegedly subjects her to cruelty should not automatically be permitted to rely upon the technical invalidity of that relationship as a complete defence.
The relationship, the High Court observed, had the “trappings of a marital union.”
That decision ultimately reached the Supreme Court.
What the Supreme Court Actually Held
This is where precision matters.
The Supreme Court did not declare that every live-in partner is a “husband” for every purpose.
The Court’s reasoning is narrower.
Section 498-A can apply where a live-in relationship satisfies the requirements of a relationship in the nature of marriage, provided that the parties are consenting adults and intent to marry is established as an intrinsic part of the relationship.
That qualification is critical.
A romantic relationship is not automatically transformed into a relationship in the nature of marriage merely because two people live together.
Nor does every form of cohabitation attract Section 498-A.
The Court retained a threshold inquiry into the character of the relationship.
The extended interpretation is also confined to Section 498-A. It does not automatically mean that the same interpretation must be imported into every other criminal or civil provision dealing with marriage, maintenance, succession or family status.
That distinction will become increasingly important as lawyers begin testing the judgment in other statutory contexts.
The Importance of the “Intent to Marry” Requirement
Perhaps the most important practical feature of Lokesh B.H. is the emphasis on intent to marry.
The Court did not simply say that long-term cohabitation is enough.
The relationship must have the character of marriage, and the intention to marry must form an intrinsic part of it.
This gives the defence a significant question to raise in an appropriate case:
Was this actually a relationship in the nature of marriage, or was it simply a romantic or domestic relationship without an intention to marry?
The answer will necessarily depend upon evidence.
The parties’ conduct, communications, representations to others, domestic arrangements and surrounding circumstances may all become relevant.
At the same time, courts will have to be careful not to turn every expression of affection, promise or future intention into proof of an intention to marry.
That is one of the areas where future cases are likely to provide much-needed clarity.
Why the Supreme Court Refused to Quash the Case
The Supreme Court declined to terminate the criminal proceedings at the threshold.
The allegations included concealment of the earlier marriage, dowry-related harassment and physical injury.
If those allegations are taken at face value, the Court found that they disclose a cognizable offence sufficient to justify continuation of the proceedings.
This distinction is fundamental.
The Supreme Court was not conducting a criminal trial.
It was not deciding whether the allegations were ultimately true.
It was deciding whether the case should be thrown out at the quashing stage.
That means the judgment should not be read as a finding of guilt or even as a final determination of the disputed facts.
For lawyers dealing with Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS petitions, that procedural distinction is particularly important.
What Section 498-A and Section 85 BNS Actually Provide
Section 498-A IPC applies to a husband or relative of a husband who subjects a woman to cruelty.
The offence carries imprisonment of up to three years and fine.
The statutory concept of cruelty includes wilful conduct of a nature likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury, as well as harassment connected with unlawful demands for property or valuable security.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita carries the offence forward through Section 85, while the definition of cruelty appears in Section 86.
The statutory language is substantially similar.
That is why Lokesh B.H. is likely to become relevant in cases involving conduct occurring after 1 July 2024.
One point, however, should remain clear: the Supreme Court did not rewrite the statutory text.
The word “husband” remains in the legislation.
The Court interpreted that expression purposively in light of the object of the provision and the particular category of relationship before it.
The Earlier Supreme Court Decisions: Reema Aggarwal, Velusamy and Indra Sarma
The judgment sits within a complicated line of earlier authorities.
One important decision is Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004).
There, the Supreme Court refused to allow a man to escape the consequences of Sections 498-A and 304-B merely because the marriage in question was legally void.
The Court looked at the substance of the relationship and the mischief that the legislation was designed to address.
The reasoning was that the criminal law was directed towards the social evil of cruelty and dowry-related harassment, rather than merely the technical validity of a marriage.
There was, however, another line of authority.
In Shivcharan Lal Verma and U. Suvetha v. State (2009), the Supreme Court adopted a stricter approach to the expression “husband” and treated a legally recognised marriage as significant to the operation of Section 498-A.
Some High Courts continued to follow that more restrictive understanding.
At the same time, another body of jurisprudence developed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court considered when a live-in relationship could be regarded as a relationship in the nature of marriage.
The factors identified included matters such as:
| Factors Identified |
|---|
| the duration of the relationship; |
| whether the parties shared a household; |
| whether they pooled financial resources; |
| the nature of their domestic arrangements; |
| the nature of the sexual relationship; |
| whether they had children; |
| whether they represented themselves publicly as spouses; and |
| the intention and conduct of the parties. |
These were never intended to operate as a rigid checklist. They are indicators to help determine the character of the relationship.
Lokesh B.H. takes that established concept and brings it into the Section 498-A context, while adding the further emphasis on intent to marry.
That is the significant doctrinal development.
Also Read: Foreign Court Judgment Enforcement in India: Supreme Court RAKIA Judgment & Section 44A CPC
Why the Court Adopted a Purposive Interpretation
The Supreme Court was conscious of the familiar tension between two principles.
Penal statutes ordinarily require careful and strict interpretation.
At the same time, interpretation cannot be so narrowly formalistic that the provision becomes incapable of addressing the very mischief for which Parliament enacted it.
Section 498-A was introduced to address cruelty against women within domestic and matrimonial relationships, particularly cruelty associated with dowry demands.
The Court’s concern was that a purely formal requirement of a legally valid ceremonial marriage could leave a gap in protection where the parties themselves had lived in a relationship substantially resembling marriage.
The Court considered the distinction between women subjected to substantially similar domestic cruelty but placed in different legal categories.
That reasoning was connected to Article 14.
The judgment also considered Article 21 and the constitutional significance of personal choice, dignity and liberty.
The point is not that the Constitution has converted every live-in relationship into a marriage.
It has not.
The narrower proposition is that the absence of a formal ceremony cannot, by itself, be treated as a complete answer where the relationship otherwise falls within the category the Court has identified.
Why the Domestic Violence Act Was Not Considered Enough
Another argument before the Court was that live-in partners already have remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The Supreme Court did not regard that as a complete substitute for Section 498-A.
The Domestic Violence Act is principally designed around civil and protective remedies.
Although it contains a penal consequence for breach of a protection order, its structure and purpose are different from a criminal prosecution for cruelty under Section 498-A.
The Court therefore rejected the proposition that the existence of the DV Act automatically eliminates the need to consider criminal liability under Section 498-A.
Again, however, the reasoning should be kept within its proper boundaries.
The Court was addressing the specific statutory question before it. It was not creating a general criminal-law status for all persons in live-in relationships.
Arnesh Kumar: Arrest Has Not Become Automatic
This part of the judgment deserves particular attention.
If the scope of Section 498-A has expanded in certain circumstances, it does not follow that arrest has become automatic.
The Supreme Court expressly reiterated the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar.
Those safeguards remain important for both the alleged offender and his relatives.
The police must continue to comply with the applicable statutory requirements concerning arrest.
The relevant checklist under Section 41 CrPC and the corresponding provision under the BNSS must be followed. Reasons must be recorded where required, notices of appearance must be issued in appropriate cases, and the Magistrate retains an independent duty to scrutinise the question of detention.
The Court emphasised that these safeguards require particular discipline in cases falling within the expanded understanding of Section 498-A.
That is not an incidental observation.
It is part of the balance the judgment attempts to maintain.
The Court has recognised a wider category of relationships for the limited purpose of Section 498-A, while insisting that the coercive machinery of arrest cannot simply be set in motion without statutory safeguards.
Also Read: File Legal Notice in India: Complete Guide to Drafting, Procedure, Cost & Legal Rights
What Changes for the Complainant
For a complainant, one familiar preliminary obstacle has become less decisive.
The mere production of an earlier marriage certificate, or an argument that the subsequent relationship was never formally registered, will not necessarily dispose of the criminal case.
The court can examine the substance of the relationship.
If the allegations disclose that the parties lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, that the relationship involved an intention to marry, and that cruelty occurred within that relationship, the case may proceed despite the absence of a legally valid ceremonial marriage.
This makes the factual presentation of the relationship extremely important.
- How did the parties live?
- How did they describe themselves?
- Did they share a home?
- How were finances handled?
- Did they hold themselves out as spouses?
- What evidence exists concerning an intention to marry?
These questions may become as important as the formal marriage documents themselves.
What Changes for the Defence
For defence counsel, the strategy necessarily becomes more nuanced.
The argument “there was no marriage” may no longer be sufficient on its own.
The more relevant questions become:
- Was this actually a relationship in the nature of marriage?
- Was there an intent to marry?
- Do the allegations satisfy the statutory definition of cruelty?
Evidence may therefore become crucial.
| Evidence and Circumstances |
|---|
| the duration of the relationship; |
| whether the parties actually maintained a shared household; |
| whether they represented themselves as spouses; |
| the nature of their financial and domestic arrangements; |
| whether there was evidence of an intention to marry; |
| whether either party knew that the other was already married; and |
| whether the complaint contains specific allegations satisfying the statutory ingredients of cruelty. |
A civil suit seeking a declaration of status may still have strategic value.
But the existence of such a civil proceeding does not automatically bring the criminal prosecution to an end.
The two proceedings may have different questions and different consequences.
Quashing After Lokesh B.H.
The judgment does not eliminate the jurisdiction to quash.
It changes the argument that may have to be made.
Where a complaint alleges a marriage-like domestic relationship together with acts constituting cruelty, a quashing petition cannot necessarily succeed merely because the parties were not legally married.
But that does not mean every 498-A complaint arising from a live-in relationship must proceed to trial.
The court can still examine whether, assuming the allegations to be true, the essential ingredients of the offence are disclosed.
If the relationship is plainly outside the category of a relationship in the nature of marriage, or if there is no basis for the required intent to marry, that may remain a relevant ground.
Similarly, if the factual allegations do not amount to statutory cruelty even when taken at face value, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction remains available.
The correct approach is therefore not to treat Lokesh B.H. as eliminating quashing, but to understand how the grounds for quashing have shifted.
What About the Relatives?
The position of relatives may require separate analysis.
Section 498-A refers not only to the husband but also to a relative of the husband.
If the male partner is treated as falling within the statutory expression for this limited purpose, an argument based solely on the absence of a valid marriage may become less effective against relatives as well.
But relatives are not automatically liable merely because they have been named in a complaint.
Their individual role, the specificity of the allegations against them and the applicable arrest safeguards remain important.
For defence counsel representing relatives, the focus may therefore increasingly shift towards:
- absence of specific allegations;
- lack of a direct role in the alleged cruelty;
- geographical or factual distance from the relationship;
- contradictions in the complaint; and
- compliance with Arnesh Kumar safeguards.
The Questions Lokesh B.H. Has Left Open
This is where caution becomes essential.
The judgment should not be read as having answered every question concerning live-in relationships and criminal liability.
It has not held that every long-term live-in relationship amounts to a marriage for criminal-law purposes.
It has not said that the interpretation automatically applies to succession, maintenance, bigamy or every other statute dealing with marital status.
Most importantly, the judgment does not provide an exhaustive definition of what constitutes proof of intent to marry.
That issue is likely to generate substantial litigation.
The following questions remain open:
- Would an engagement be sufficient?
- What about messages discussing a future wedding?
- What if the parties attempted to register a marriage but failed?
- What if one party introduced the other as a future spouse?
- What if the parties lived together for many years but never discussed marriage?
These questions cannot simply be answered by assuming that every factual situation falls within Lokesh B.H.
They will have to be decided case by case.
The Difficult Question of an Existing Marriage
There is another issue that deserves particular attention.
Indra Sarma had examined circumstances in which a woman knowingly entered into a relationship with a man who was already married. The absence of exclusivity was relevant to whether the relationship could be treated as one in the nature of marriage under the Domestic Violence Act.
Lokesh B.H. arose against a factual background involving an allegation that the earlier marriage had been concealed.
How the new Section 498-A principle will operate where the woman knew from the beginning that the man was already married is therefore an important question.
The Supreme Court’s judgment does not appear to settle every aspect of that issue.
That distinction should be respected.
It would be unsafe to take a principle developed on one factual foundation and mechanically apply it to every other form of live-in relationship.
Future cases will almost certainly test this boundary.
The Current Position After Lokesh B.H.
The position can therefore be stated relatively simply.
Section 498-A IPC, and Section 85 BNS for the applicable post-1 July 2024 offences, can extend to certain live-in relationships where the relationship is in the nature of marriage and an intention to marry forms an intrinsic part of it.
Key Limits Under The Current Law
- A casual romantic relationship does not automatically become a marriage-like relationship.
- The extended interpretation is confined to the statutory context addressed by the judgment.
- The allegations must still disclose the ingredients of cruelty.
- The existence of a live-in relationship does not automatically establish criminal liability.
- And arrest continues to be governed by the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar and the applicable statutory provisions.
For defence counsel, the absence of a formal marriage can no longer be treated as the complete answer.
For complainants, the judgment provides a route around an argument that previously focused heavily on the technical validity of the marriage.
For prosecutors, the quality of evidence concerning the nature of the relationship and the parties’ intention will become increasingly important.
And for trial courts, the difficult task will be to distinguish genuine marriage-like relationships from ordinary romantic cohabitation without turning every live-in relationship into a criminal-law marriage.
A Judgment Whose Real Impact Will Be Seen in Future Cases
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka is significant, but it should not be overstated.
The Supreme Court has not declared that live-in relationships are marriages.
It has addressed a narrower question: when the relationship itself has the character of marriage and an intent to marry forms part of that relationship, the absence of a formally valid marriage does not necessarily prevent Section 498-A from operating.
That is a meaningful change in the way certain 498-A cases will have to be approached.
The Practical Consequences
The immediate consequence is practical.
The complainant’s case can no longer be dismissed merely by pointing to the absence of a valid marriage. The defence, meanwhile, has to engage directly with the character of the relationship, the evidence of intent to marry and the ingredients of cruelty.
At the same time, Arnesh Kumar remains relevant. Arrest is not automatic. And the boundaries of the new doctrine remain to be worked out.
The next generation of cases will therefore be important.
They will have to answer the questions Lokesh B.H. has opened: what evidence establishes an intent to marry, how the Indra Sarma factors interact with the new criminal-law test, and where the line should be drawn between a genuine relationship in the nature of marriage and ordinary cohabitation.
For now, the safest reading is also the most useful one for practice:
the law has moved beyond a purely formal question of whether a valid marriage ceremony took place. But it has not abandoned the requirement of proving the character of the relationship and the statutory ingredients of cruelty.
That distinction is likely to define the next phase of Section 498-A litigation.
Facing a Section 498-A Case Involving a Live-In Relationship?
A dispute involving a live-in relationship, alleged marriage, Section 498-A IPC or Section 85 BNS can quickly become legally complicated. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka has made the nature of the relationship, intent to marry, allegations of cruelty and the possibility of quashing even more important.
If you are facing a 498-A FIR, criminal complaint, quashing petition, matrimonial dispute, or allegations arising from a live-in relationship, do not rely solely on the fact that there was no formal marriage. The legal position now requires a careful examination of the facts, evidence and applicable Supreme Court precedents.
Need Legal Advice or Supreme Court Representation?
Get your case assessed by an experienced advocate before taking the next legal step.
Adv. Tarun Choudhury
Supreme Court Advocate | 25+ Years of Legal Experience
Whether you are a complainant seeking legal protection, an accused seeking defence against Section 498-A / Section 85 BNS allegations, or looking to explore quashing of criminal proceedings, timely legal advice can make a significant difference to how your case is approached.
- 📞 Call: 9650499965
- 💬 WhatsApp: 8851978611
- 📧 Email: [email protected]
Discuss your case confidentially and understand your legal options before the matter goes further.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. Can Section 498-A IPC Apply to a Live-In Relationship If There Was No Valid Marriage?
Yes. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, Section 498-A IPC can apply to certain live-in relationships even where there was no legally valid marriage. The relationship must qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, and intent to marry must be an intrinsic part of the relationship. The judgment does not, however, treat every live-in relationship as a marriage for criminal-law purposes.
2. What Is a “Relationship in the Nature of Marriage” Under Section 498-A?
A relationship in the nature of marriage is not determined merely by the fact that two people lived together. Courts may consider factors such as the duration of the relationship, shared household, financial arrangements, domestic responsibilities, public representation as spouses, children, the nature of the relationship and the parties’ intention and conduct. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lokesh B.H. builds upon the principles discussed in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma.
3. Does Section 85 BNS Apply to Live-In Relationships in Cases of Alleged Cruelty?
The reasoning in Lokesh B.H. is relevant to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for offences committed after 1 July 2024. Section 85 carries forward the offence of cruelty, while Section 86 contains the definition of cruelty. Where the relationship satisfies the Supreme Court’s requirements, including the relationship-in-the-nature-of-marriage test and intent to marry, the judgment may become relevant to a Section 85 BNS case.
4. Can a Section 498-A Case Arising From a Live-In Relationship Be Quashed Because There Was No Formal Marriage?
Not necessarily. After Dr. Lokesh B.H., the absence of a formal or legally valid marriage is not, by itself, sufficient to obtain quashing where the complaint otherwise alleges a marriage-like relationship and acts constituting cruelty. However, quashing may still be considered where the relationship does not qualify as a relationship in the nature of marriage, there is no basis for the required intent to marry, or the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of cruelty even when taken at face value.
5. Can the Police Automatically Arrest a Person in a Section 498-A or Section 85 BNS Case Involving a Live-In Relationship?
No. The Supreme Court reiterated that the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar continue to apply. Arrest is not automatic merely because a Section 498-A or Section 85 BNS complaint has been registered. The applicable statutory requirements concerning arrest, recording of reasons, notice of appearance and Magistrate scrutiny must continue to be followed.
Key Takeaways: Supreme Court on Section 498-A and Live-In Relationships
- Section 498-A IPC can apply to certain live-in relationships: The Supreme Court in Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 784, held that Section 498-A can extend to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage.”
- Intent to marry is a crucial requirement: The relationship must involve an intent to marry as an intrinsic part of the relationship. Not every romantic or cohabiting relationship falls within Section 498-A.
- A formal marriage is not always decisive: The absence of a legally valid or formally solemnised marriage does not, by itself, prevent Section 498-A from applying where the relationship otherwise satisfies the Supreme Court’s requirements.
- Section 85 BNS is relevant to post-1 July 2024 offences: The reasoning is relevant to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with Section 86 BNS containing the definition of cruelty.
- The “relationship in the nature of marriage” test remains fact-specific: Courts may examine factors such as duration of cohabitation, shared household, financial arrangements, domestic responsibilities, public representation as spouses, children, intention and conduct of the parties.
- The judgment does not cover every live-in relationship: Casual relationships, short-term romantic relationships or cohabitation without the characteristics of marriage do not automatically attract Section 498-A.
- Reema Aggarwal remains important: The judgment builds upon the purposive approach taken in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, where the Court looked beyond the technical validity of a marriage when considering the mischief targeted by Section 498-A.
- D. Velusamy and Indra Sarma remain relevant: The Supreme Court’s understanding of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” draws upon the earlier jurisprudence developed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
- Arnesh Kumar arrest safeguards continue to apply: A Section 498-A or Section 85 BNS case does not automatically justify arrest. The applicable statutory safeguards, reasons for arrest, notice requirements and Magistrate scrutiny remain important.
- Quashing is not automatically barred: The absence of a formal marriage may no longer be sufficient by itself for quashing, but proceedings can still be challenged where the relationship does not satisfy the required test or where the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of cruelty.
- Defence strategy must focus on the character of the relationship: In appropriate cases, defence counsel may need to examine evidence concerning shared residence, duration, public representation, domestic arrangements and intent to marry, rather than relying solely on the argument that no valid marriage existed.
- The law is still developing: Lokesh B.H. provides an important framework, but the precise boundaries of “intent to marry” and its interaction with the earlier Indra Sarma principles will likely require further judicial clarification.
Important Links
- Lawyers in India
- Copyright Registration in India
- Caveat Filing in Supreme Court of India
- Mutual Consent Divorce in Delhi NCR: WhatsApp 9650499965
